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Professor Vanda Lamm, Director of the Institute for Legal Studies of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, has published her third book on the problems 
of international adjudication. The volume elaborates on the regime of compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was set up 
in the wake of World War One, and of the United Nations International Court 
of Justice, which replaced the former after the second conflagration, by 
studying the practice of States, the decisions of the two Courts, and exploring 
and probing into the whole spectrum of the pertinent literature. 
 The peaceful relations among States means not simply the lack of the use 
force, as it would be equivalent to a continuous maintenance of the status quo. 
That is impossible, however, for the different economic and social processes 
result in an inevitable transformation of interstate relations. To achieve genuine 
peace, it is necessary to open up a possibility for peaceful change without 
upsetting the legally regulated system of relations between the States concerned, 
Under such circumstances paramount importance is attached to creating a 
delicate balance between the dynamics of change and the need for stability. 
This in turn is hardly conceivable without international legal disputes, the 
settlement of which calls for a relative equilibrium between subordination and 
superordination of States in respect to the settlement of a concrete conflict: 
small and large States may equally advance international legal arguments 
before an independent and impartial forum. Settlement of interstate disputes by 
international judicial fora, primarily the International Court of Justice, is 
therefore a matter of the utmost importance. 
                                                     
 1 Earlier volumes by the author: Az államok közötti viták rendezésének története 
(History of the Settlement of Interstate Disputes). Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990.; and A 
Nemzetközi Bíróság ítéletei és tanácsadói véleményei 1945–1993 (Judgements and Advisory 
Opinions of the International Court of Justice 1945–1993). Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, 1995. 
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 However, as is also stated by Vanda Lamm, States are averse to having 
grave conflicts that affect the core and substance of their sovereignty submitted 
to an international judicial forum. What are the reasons for misgivings about 
independent and impartial fora? The first reason, well illustrated by Vanda 
Lamm, is the fact that surrender of control over decisions is understood by 
States to mean reducing their power, which, if that course is taken, becomes 
objective, incapable of being influenced and impossible to modify or to overbid. 
Since a judicial forum decides according to international law, it takes a dispute 
from the complex system of relations between the States parties, thereby 
failing to consider, e.g., the importance of economic relations between the two 
States, the foreign policy influences on them within an eventual common 
system of alliance, the effects exerted by the two prime ministers belonging to 
a common family of political parties, and so on. Moreover, a forum formally 
functioning as a court is bound to create a winner and a loser, which carries 
domestic policy risks. As against this, in the case of third-party involvement as 
another chief diplomatic way of conflict settlement beside negotiations, a great 
power playing such a middleman role may offer guarantees for bringing about 
a stable settlement and provide services for the parties to the dispute, which 
tend to compensate for any loss that may be associated with the agreement. All 
this is absent from a decision by an international judicial forum. 
 Accordingly, in contrast to domestic courts, the jurisdiction of international 
judicial fora is based on the express consent of the disputant States. Such 
was/is also consequently the case when the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice was, or that of the United Nations International Court 
of Justice is, accepted. Under the optional clause contained in the Statute, States 
could or can, by making a unilateral declaration, recognize the jurisdiction of 
these two fora in respect of their disputes with other States having made such a 
declaration. The monograph discusses the optional clause as well as the special 
features, the theoretical and practical issues, and the procedural problems 
connected declarations accepting jurisdiction. 
 The first chapter sums up the history of international arbitration, with 
particular attention devoted to the ways and means of attaining compulsory 
international adjudication. At The Hague Second Peace Conference early in 
the 20th century it was believed possible to achieve compulsory international 
adjudication only in legal matters, and not in political issues, with even excep-
tions to be allowed to matters affecting the vital interests, the independence 
and the honour of States. 
 The second chapter discusses the history of the elaboration of the optional 
clause and its concept. The members of the 1920 Committee of Jurists entrusted 
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with drawing up the draft on the international judicial forum to be established 
gave different interpretations of Art. XIV of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations as to whether or not that Article provided for compulsory jurisdiction. 
The long-drawnout debate was concluded with the adoption of the Brazilian 
jurist Fernandez’s proposal as embodied in Article 36, of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. Under this Article, States may declare 
that they accept the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the 
interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of 
any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation, and the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach 
of an international obligation. Such declarations may be made unconditionally 
or on condition of reciprocity, or for a certain time. Two and a half decades 
later, at the San Francisco Conference elaborating the Charter of the United 
Nations, the small and middle powers seemed inclined to establish compulsory 
international adjudication, but it was categorically refused by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. While effecting minor changes and spelling out 
functional continuity between the two Courts, the Conference took over the 
earlier wording of the optional clause for the new Court. The author points 
out that the system constituted by declarations of acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction has created a special kind of international adjudication in respect 
of States assuming the extra obligation, with the rules thereof actually evolved 
by over eight decades of State practice and by the decisions of the Courts. 
 The third chapter deals with the special features of declarations of acceptance, 
including questions like the freedom of States to make a declaration of accep-
tance, the operation of the autonomy of the will of the parties regarding the 
content of declarations, problems of collective declarations of acceptance, 
problems concerning the ratification and the deposit of declarations, and the 
continuing validity of declarations made during the interwar period. As is 
emphasized by Vanda Lamm, the two Courts prescribed no formalities for 
declarations of acceptance, which, however, must clearly show the clear 
intent to accept jurisdiction. Under the judicial practice, declarations must be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and are to enter 
into force on the day of deposit. The author stresses that insertion as suggested 
of an intervening period between the making and the entry into force of 
declarations of acceptance would not but encourage some States to try to evade 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by taking advantage of it 
for denouncing or modifying their own declaration. In addition, it would be 
difficult to answer the question of how long the reasonable time as suggested 
by the some authors would exactly be until entry into force. It may be added to 
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the author’s latter statement that the International Court of Justice might, in its 
decisions, name the factors of reckoning the reasonable time and might 
specify, following the example of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
length of the period that obviously extends beyond that time. As has been 
graphically demonstrated by Vanda Lamm, in order for a declaration made in 
respect of the Permanent Court of International Justice to remain valid without 
any special act in respect of the United Nations International Court of Justice 
the latter’s practice requires that at the time of accession to the Statute of the 
new Court the declaration should be valid and that the State concerned should 
have been continuously a party to the Statutes of both Courts. 
 The fact that States attach reservations to their declarations of acceptance, 
while at the same time excluding certain issues from the scope thereof, may 
appear surprising at first sight. In actuality, however, there is no cause for 
surprise, stresses the author, since States make use of that tool even in the case 
of declarations accepting the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. From the fourth 
chapter on the admissibility of reservations to declarations of acceptance it 
becomes clear that making reservations between the two World Wars was 
just as permissible as it has been after World War Two. Nevertheless, the post-
1945 period has hardly seen any declaration of acceptance that contains no 
reservation. According to Vanda Lamm, the reasons can be summed up as 
follows. Practically every State is confronted with some international problem 
which it would not like to bring before the International Court of Justice. The 
advance of science and technology may give rise to new international disputes 
in respect of which States wish to preserve their right of disposal. Finally, it is 
the earlier decisions of the Court that lead to such a reservation, notably States 
wish to avoid similar situations by the use of that device. Considering that, on 
the basis of the principle of reciprocity, reservations may also be invoked by 
the opponent State and that other States may likewise deem it well advised to 
withdraw a particular issue from the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, few 
objections are raised to reservations, stresses the author. 
 As regards the classification of reservations, the study accepts the traditional 
division (ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis), while renewing 
it by introducing the classes of generally accepted and destructive reservations. 
The first class includes reservations that can be considered as accepted on the 
whole by the community of States, whereas reservations undermining the regime 
of the optional clause and rendering acceptance of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction illusory are consigned to the second class. As will, be treated in 
detail in the seventh and eighth chapters of this volume, the first class comprises 
reservations like those concerning, e.g., other means of peaceful settlement, 
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hostilities and armed conflicts, or objective domestic jurisdiction, and the other 
consists of reservations relating to subjective domestic jurisdiction (Conally) and 
multilateral treaties (Vandenberg). (I shall return to the question of classification 
at a later stage, after the review of the said chapters.) 
 The fifth chapter of the monograph examines the legal nature of the regime 
of the optional clause. In it, the author draws upon State practice and the Court’s 
relevant decisions in proving that the system of declarations is not contractual 
in nature. Hence nor are such the relations between States party to the regime. 
The sixth chapter analyzes the operation of the principle of reciprocity with 
regard to declarations. For reciprocity to prevail, namely for suability to be 
ensured, States are required to make a declaration in respect to one and the 
same obligation, yet this does not entail the need to make identical declarations 
in all aspects, but a different wording will do just as well. In the Interhandel 
Case the International Court of Justice pointed up to the limits of reciprocity 
by stating that reciprocity does not entitle a State, namely the United States in 
the case at hand, to invoke a limitation which the other party, Switzerland, did 
not include in its own declaration of acceptance. On the other hand, the principle 
of reciprocity does not preclude, as the Court held in another cases, the possibility 
of the claiming State filing an application just a few days after the deposit of its 
declaration. Nevertheless, reciprocity does not apply to formal questions such as 
the duration and the entry into force of declarations. The author observes that 
reciprocity entails important consequences. The parties are in no position to 
know in the abstract the exact scope of The Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of 
declarations of acceptance, because it depends on the line-up of claiming and 
defending States. Since reciprocity prevails in respect of reservations and 
limitations as well, this principle puts States that make such declarations on an 
equal footing with those that refrain from making reservations to or placing 
limitations on their declarations. A reservation may thus be pleaded even by 
the opponent party, so it may prove counterproductive as it is applied against 
the declarant State with a view to avoiding the action brought by that State. 
 The seventh chapter on the generally accepted reservations explores the entire 
range thereof along with the aforementioned reservations made with regard to 
other means of peaceful settlement of disputes, hostilities and armed conflicts, 
and objective domestic jurisdiction, discussing reservations relating to territorial 
sovereignty and environmental protection, referring to the existence or lack of 
close relations between States, and excluding the retroactive effect of decla-
rations, and surprise applications. Among the less frequent reservations it deals 
with those affecting constitutional matters, linking the entry into force of a 
declaration to declarations by other States, relating to disputes about a specific 
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treaty or specific treaties, and excluding disputes with regard to foreign debts 
and liabilities. 
 The author notes that reservations relating to the means of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes should not be confused with cases where the parties may not 
have recourse to the Court except after having conducted negotiations or 
having employed the conciliation procedure according to the provisions of the 
particular treaty. In the first case a dispute cannot be submitted to the Court on 
the ground of the inapplicability of the optional clause. As concerns reservations 
with regard to hostilities and armed conflicts, the author stresses that the more 
recent reservations of this type exclude disputes about acts of individual and 
collective self-defence and/ against aggression as well as about peace-keeping 
operations of international organizations. Drawing upon the literature on the 
subject, Vanda Lamm underscores the need for a thorough examination of 
whether or not a particular State was involved in the hostilities at the time of 
the events giving rise to the dispute and whether there is a direct or indirect 
causal relationship between the events and the dispute under consideration. 
The more recent reservations relating to territorial sovereignty tend to exclude 
from the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction issues of marine areas and air-space 
along with border disputes. In connection with these two classes of cases it is 
worth observing that the related reservations are a clear indication that a large 
number of States are loath to have their major conflicts settled by decisions of 
a law-enforcing nature handed down by an objective, impartial forum. 
 The essence of reservations relating to objective domestic jurisdiction is 
that a State excludes from the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction such matters 
which according to international law are belonging to national jurisdiction. The 
author asserts that if such a reservation is relied upon by a State in connection 
with a concrete mater, the Court has the right and the duty to decide up on that 
matter. Reservations intended to prevent surprise applications may be aimed at, 
inter alia, ruling out the possibility of filing an application against the particular 
State immediately upon the entry into forte of its declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court. In such instance the entry into forte of the declaration 
is suspended for a period of six or twelve months in general, the suspension 
opening up a possibility to denounce or to amend the declaration, too. The 
other type of related reservations is intended to prevent the Court considering a 
legal dispute in cases where a State has expressly made a declaration of 
acceptance for the purpose of submitting a particular matter to the Court. As is 
stated by Vanda Lamm, the question arises whether such a reservation is aimed 
at preventing the given matter from ever being brought before the Court or 
such aim is subject to proof. 
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 As noted earlier, destructive reservations are discussed in the seventh 
chapter. The core and substance of a reservation relating to subjective domestic 
jurisdiction, which is associated with the name of the American senator 
Conally, is that the matters coming within domestic jurisdiction and excluded 
from the Court’s jurisdiction are unilaterally determined by the declarant State 
itself. Operative for forty years, the original American formula has been adopted 
by a number of States, with minor changes in its wording in this particular 
case. The author points out that the literature on international law is unanimous 
in emphasizing the importance of good faith in the practice of making 
reservations. Since bad faith cannot be presumed, the principle of good faith 
can but provide a weak guarantee in respect of resorting to such reservations. 
 Similarly associated with the name of an American senator, Vandenberg,2 
is the type of reservation relating to multilateral treaties. The crucial point in 
the first version of this reservation is the requirement for the States concerned 
to agree in bringing a particular dispute before the Court. The United States 
reservation is vague as it fails to clearly enunciate whether all States involved 
in a dispute or all the contracting parties should be in agreement on having the 
dispute considered by the Court, asserts the author. At any rate, in the Case 
concerning Military and Para-Military Activities in and against Nicaragua, the 
United States opted for a narrower interpretation, while in its judgment the 
Court accepted it, holding that it had jurisdiction to identify the States involved 
in the dispute. The States following the American example have come to use 
another version of the formula which requires all States party to a given multi-
lateral treaty to participate as parties in the proceedings. Furthermore, in dealing 
with this type of reservations, Vanda Lamm emphasizes that it is not clear 
what position will be taken by the rest of the States party to the multilateral 
treaty in question, especially since the position of the intervening State in the 
proceedings before the Court is almost equally unclarified. According to the 
second version of the Vandenberg reservation, in cases where the United States is 
a party to a multilateral treaty the US must expressly consent to the Court’s 
jurisdiction, which enables it to block the proceedings unilaterally. By excluding 
the interpretation of multilateral treaties from the scope of the Court’s juris-
diction the Vandenberg reservation has a particularly destructive effect on 
international adjudication, because, as is stressed by the author, similar disputes 
tend to arise in a considerable number of cases brought before the Court, let 
                                                     
 2 Vandenberg is known to have made the proposal on which the American Senate 
authorized the United States to participate in a military alliance, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, in time of peace. 
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alone the fart, we may add, that nearly all important fields of international law 
are governed by multilateral treaties to which a large number of States are party. 
 Perhaps the most interesting, exposition of the subject is to be found in 
the part of the monograph dealing with the relationship between destructive 
reservations and the Statute of the Court. An invalid reservation is to carry 
implications for the declaration itself, which also becomes invalid, or else it 
would compel the given State to assume an extra obligation by reason of the 
fact that the State should accept the Court’s jurisdiction without making a 
reservation. And those who criticized the International Court of Justice for 
having failed to take a position on the question of contestable reservations are 
but seemingly right, because acceptance of the validity of those reservations 
would have encouraged other States to make similar reservations and would 
have undermined the Court’s own authority, as a pronouncement thereon would 
have been tantamount to the Court clearly acknowledging that its right to 
decide on the question of its jurisdiction had greatly narrowed in range. On the 
other hand, however, declaring the invalidity of such reservations would have 
operated to invalidate the declarations themselves, thereby the Court itself 
narrowing the scope of its jurisdiction, for in practice a particular State may 
happen not to invoke its destructive reservation in a given case. 
 Returning now to the question of classification of reservations, what is 
certain is that a reservation not belonging to the class of destructive ones does 
not mean its being constructive as it also implies a limit to the acceptance of 
jurisdiction. It is nevertheless undeniable that the reservations consigned by 
the author to the generally accepted category are less destructive with respect 
to the possibility to establish the Court’s jurisdiction, the reason being that they 
were formulated with relative precision, so in this sense they have a limited effect, 
whereas the reservations relating to objective domestic jurisdiction preserve the 
Court’s discretionary right. Thus, on the whole, they are less arbitrary and less 
questionable. At the same time, however, the reservations relating to hostilities 
and armed conflicts and territorial disputes are the most destructive possible if 
viewed in the context of the significance and actual role of international 
adjudication as a means of peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
 The ninth chapter of the monograph is concerned with the termination and 
modification of declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction. The author 
emphasizes that once the proceedings before the Court have been instituted, 
termination or modification has no effect on the matter under consideration. 
Even declarations failing to provide for denunciation, i.e. made for an un-
definited period, may be denounced, practically at any time. By contrast, 
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declarations made for a definite period and fixing no date for denunciation 
cannot be terminated except upon expiry of the period of notice. 
 The tenth chapter sums up the author’s conclusions, while also discussing 
the prospects for acceptance of jurisdiction and the approach thereto of the 
permanent members of the Security Council. 
 The monograph is completed with useful annexes on the cases submitted to 
the two World Courts under the optional clause and on the declarations of 
acceptance. 
 It can be stated in summary that this monograph is an excellent work 
discussing fundamental, issues and covering a wealth of related material. 
Hopefully it will be available soon in English for a wider professional 
audience. 
 
Gábor Kardos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
